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Sports in the Courts:
How Sports References Strengthen Written 
Advocacy and Judicial Opinions (Part I)
WRITING IT RIGHT
 Early in the morning of July 23, 
2000, four police officers responded 
to a call about a melee at a home in 
Brigham City, Utah. Through a screen 
door and windows, the arriving of-
ficers witnessed a violent fight and a 
victim spitting blood into the kitchen 
sink.  The officers opened the door, 
announced their presence, entered the 
kitchen, quelled the altercation, and 
made arrests. 
 In 2006, in Brigham City v. Stuart, 
the Supreme Court unanimously held 
that the Fourth Amendment permitted 
the officers to enter the home without 
a warrant because they had an objec-
tively reasonable basis for believing 
that an occupant was seriously injured, 
or imminently threatened with serious 
injury.1 Writing for the Court, Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. reinforced 
the holding with a sports analogy: 
“The role of a peace officer includes 
preventing violence and restoring 
order, not simply rendering first aid 
to casualties; an officer is not like a 
boxing (or hockey) referee, poised to 
stop a bout only if it becomes too one-
sided.”2
 Brigham City’s analogy was un-
prompted because no reference to 
sports appeared anywhere in the briefs 
of either party or any amicus. 
 Chief Justice Roberts – the cap-
tain of his high school football team 
years earlier and thus conversant in 
athletics3 – employed a rhetorical 
technique increasingly used by the 
By Douglas E. Abrams Justices and lower federal and state 
judges since the early 1970s.  In cases 
with no claims or defenses concern-
ing sports, written opinions frequently 
help explain substantive or procedural 
points with references to the rules or 
terminology of sports familiar to many 
Americans. 
 This two-part article explores the 
growth of this familiar rhetorical tech-
nique in the courts. Part I here discuss-
es the proliferation of sports references 
in Supreme Court opinions, and begins 
discussing that proliferation in the 
lower federal and state courts. In the 
next issue of Precedent, Part II finishes 
discussing sports references in lower 
courts, and concludes by describing 
how these references invigorate formal 
writing by advocates and judges.
 Writers crafting an argument 
express themselves best when they 
“front load,” that is, when they orient 
readers by stating the conclusion at the 
outset, before proceeding to analysis 
and resolution. My conclusion here, 
which I will articulate more fully in 
Part II, is that careful use of sports 
references normally strengthens writ-
ten advocacy and judicial opinions by 
enhancing the reader’s understanding, 
but that the particularly high stakes at 
issue in some cases may make a sports 
reference seem inconsistent with the 
dignity and prestige that sustain the 
judicial role. 
 Such “high-stakes” cases incompat-
ible with sports references are few. 
The example set by the Supreme Court 
itself, where high-stakes cases are the 
norm, should continue to encourage 
careful use of sports references.   
 The word “sports” may conjure 
images of fun-and-games, assertedly 
incompatible with courtroom formal-
ity in the administration of justice. 
Careful use of sports references in 
written advocacy and judicial opin-
ions, however, recognizes that ama-
teur and professional sports is “one 
of the most powerful social forces in 
our country,”4 indeed “a microcosm 
of American society”5 with “special 
significance in our culture,”6 and thus 
with a special capacity to forge a bond 
of understanding between writer and 
reader. Advocates write for an audi-
ence distinct from the audience that 
judges seek to reach, but the bond 
remains constant for advocates and 
judges alike. 
 “Legal briefs are necessarily filled 
with abstract concepts that are difficult 
to explain,” advises Justice Antonin 
Scalia. “Nothing clarifies their mean-
ing as well as examples” because ex-
amples “cause the serious legal points 
you’re making to be more vivid, more 
lively, and hence more memorable.”7 
For advocates and judges alike, ex-
amples drawn from sports are favorites 
because they are particularly effective 
vehicles to (as Justice Scalia advises) 
“Make it interesting.”8
SPORTS REFERENCES IN 
hISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
 Before the early 1970s, sports 
references in Supreme Court and 
lower federal and state court opinions 
were not unknown, but remained 
quite rare. A court might discuss 
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legal “ground rules,” might liken 
intricate argumentation or analysis 
to the contortions characteristic 
of “gymnastics,” or might declare 
specified conduct or arguments “out 
of bounds.”9  Few decisions, however, 
ventured beyond these core sports 
terms that were already ingrained in 
the American lexicon.10    
 The flowering of sports references 
in federal and state judicial opinions 
began in earnest shortly after the 
Supreme Court handed down Flood 
v. Kuhn in 1972.11 When the St. Louis 
Cardinals traded Curt Flood to the 
Philadelphia Phillies after the 1969 
season without his consent, he wrote 
to Baseball Commissioner Bowie 
Kuhn, objecting that he was not “a 
piece of property to be bought and 
sold irrespective of my wishes.”12 
When the letter fell on deaf ears, the 
three-time all-star and seven-time 
Gold Glove winner filed an antitrust 
suit challenging the reserve clause 
in Major League baseball’s standard 
contract.  The reserve system bound 
a player to his first club for his entire 
career unless the team traded him – 
that is, assigned his contract – and 
bound the player permanently to the 
new club until a future unilateral 
trade. 
 Flood acknowledged that 
professional baseball is a business 
engaged in interstate commerce, but 
held that Major League baseball’s 
reserve system enjoyed an exemption 
from the federal antitrust laws unless 
Congress overruled prior Supreme 
Court decisions that had conferred 
the exemption. Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun’s majority opinion opened 
with a reverential history of the 
“colorful days” of baseball, climaxed 
by a list of 88 fomer Major League 
stars who “have sparked the diamond 
and its environs and . . . provided 
tinder for recaptured thrills, for 
reminiscence and comparisons, and 
for conversation and anticipation in-
season and off-season.”13 Before the 
Court presented the facts and turned 
to legal analysis, the page-long list 
closed with this solemn disclaimer: 
“These are names only from earlier 
years.  By mentioning some, one risks 
unintended omission of others equally 
celebrated.”14 
 Justice Blackmun’s odyssey into 
baseball lore was an unabashed 
fan’s pure dictum in a high-visibility 
decision awaited not only by baseball 
fans, but also by fans of other sports 
that enjoyed no judicially-conferred 
antitrust exemption.  Flood’s 
visibility grew when arbitrator Peter 
Seitz struck down baseball’s reserve 
system in the case of pitchers Andy 
Messersmith and Dave McNally 
in 1975, four years before the Bob 
Woodward-Scott Armstrong best-
seller, The Brethren, provided an 
intimate account of the justices’ 
deliberations leading to what the 
two authors called Flood’s “ode to 
baseball.”15 
 So prominent an ode in so 
prominent a decision by the nation’s 
highest court helped signal an 
expanded role for sports references 
in official judicial writing, not only 
in cases that (such as Flood itself) 
raised claims directly related to 
sports, but also in other cases (such 
as Brigham City v. Stuart) in which 
a sports reference might help a court 
explain salient points of law or 
fact.  Lower court judges typically 
examine Supreme Court opinions in 
the advance sheets, and Flood lent 
an aura of respectability to sports 
references that the justices themselves 
and the lower courts have embraced 
in their official writing ever since.16
 Flood reached the United 
States Reports at a particularly 
opportune moment for cultivating 
this respectability.  Since the early 
1970s, judges have had greater 
reason than ever before to presume 
their readers’ familiarity with a wide 
range of sports and their respective 
vocabularies. Today’s judges, lawyers 
and litigants grew into adulthood 
amid an unprecedented saturation 
of professional and amateur sports 
in broadcasting, the print media, 
and more recently on the Internet.  
Newspapers, conventional radio, 
and network television now coexist 
with, and frequently face eclipse 
by, all-sports radio stations, cable 
and satellite television channels, 
interactive blogs, and other outlets 
that provide instantaneous around-
the-clock access to sports, teams 
and star players. “[T]hrough their 
pervasive presence in the media,” 
says the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, “sports . . . celebrities 
have come to symbolize certain ideas 
and values in our society and have 
become valuable means of expression 
in our culture.”17 
 In 1976, just four years after Flood, 
writer James A. Michener correctly 
observed that “[s]ports have become 
a major force in American life.”18  For 
most Americans, immersion in (as the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit put it) the nation’s “sports-
dominated culture” begins at a tender 
age.19  Almost half the nation’s 
children – approximately 30 to 35 
million – participate each year in at 
least one public or private organized 
sports program.20   Nearly all children 
have first-hand experience playing 
organized sports before they turn 
18, and no other activity outside the 
home or school reaches so many boys 
and girls from coast to coast.21  
 Play continues beyond childhood 
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and adolescence with so-called 
“carryover,” or “lifetime,” sports 
conducive to active participation 
throughout adulthood.22  With 
influential public and private voices 
advocating the demonstrated health 
benefits of vigorous lifelong physical 
activity, sports today attracts not 
only adult spectators drawn to mass 
public entertainment, but also adult 
participants drawn to gymnasiums 
and playing fields nationwide.23  
 Sports references ingrained in our 
national culture find a comfortable 
place in written advocacy and 
opinion-writing because courts, 
like athletic competitions, apply 
an adversary model that produces 
winners and losers in contests 
monitored by neutral decision-makers 
who apply established rules and 
procedures. Judges frequently invoke 
sports to illuminate core values 
inherent in the adversary system on 
the playing field or in the court room, 
such as the “level playing field,” an 
ideal of fair play central to athletic 
competition and to the quest for equal 
justice under law.24 
 Images of the level playing 
field in written judicial opinions 
produce corollary images similarly 
grounded in adherence to the rules 
of the game.  Like officials who 
evenhandedly apply the rule book 
to the particular circumstances of a 
ballpark or other sports venue, judges 
frequently remind readers that they 
apply procedural and substantive 
“ground rules.”25 Similar to baseball 
players, litigants “may play ‘hard 
ball,’ but ‘foul ball’ is . . . totally 
unacceptable.”26  In civil and criminal 
proceedings alike, the lawyers’ 
lack of civility can degenerate 
unacceptably into “mud wrestling.”27  
When sharp practice attempts an “end 
run” around a rule or obligation,28 the 
offending party or offending lawyer 
should be “thrown for a loss,”29 the 
setback that sometimes happens in 
football to a ball carrier who seeks 
to evade tacklers by cutting a wide 
path around his own end. The parties’ 
arguments and conduct must remain 
“in bounds”30 because stepping “out 
of bounds” invites sanction in court, 
as it does on the playing field in many 
sports.31
 Courts since Flood have moved 
well beyond these core values. In the 
Supreme Court and the lower federal 
and state courts alike, the array of 
sports references that lace written 
judicial opinions today is nearly as 
broad as the kaleidoscope of sports 
that captivate so many Americans.
SPORTS REFERENCES 
IN SUPREME COURT 
OPINIONS
 Chief Justice Roberts’ analogy to 
boxing and ice hockey in Brigham 
City demonstrates the growing 
comfort with sports references that 
has been evident in Supreme Court 
opinion-writing since the early 
1970s.32  In Engquist v. Oregon 
Dep’t of Agriculture in 2008, 
golf helped the Court reject the 
employment discrimination claim 
on the ground that, as Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote for the majority, 
“treating seemingly similarly 
situated individuals differently in 
the employment context is par for 
the course,” that is, the performance 
expected.33  In Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. v. Glenn a week later, 
Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s majority 
opinion specified that a product “falls 
below par” when it fails to meet 
expectations.34
 In 2007, Morse v. Frederick upheld 
a high school principal’s suspension 
of a student who unfurled a banner 
(“BONG HiTs 4 Jesus”) at a school-
sponsored and school-supervised 
event on a public street near the 
campus.35  The Court found that the 
principal had reasonably concluded 
that the banner advocated illicit drug 
use. Football accented Justice John 
Paul Stevens’ dissenting argument 
that the Court’s First Amendment 
speech precedents also required proof 
that the student’s conduct interfered 
with the school’s educational mission. 
“[I]nstead of demanding that the 
school make such a showing,” 
wrote Justice Stevens for himself 
and Justices Souter and Ginsburg, 
“the Court punts,” and thus avoids 
confronting a difficulty, much as a 
football team avoids disadvantageous 
field position by kicking the ball 
down field and yielding possession to 
the opposition.36
 In Federal Election Commission 
v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 
(WRL) in 2007, the Court held that, 
as applied, a congressional ban on 
use of corporate funds to finance 
“electioneering communications” 
during pre-federal election periods 
violated WRL’s free speech rights.37 
The decision turned on whether 
WRL’s advertising constituted 
campaign advocacy within the ban, 
or issue advocacy outside the ban.  
Chief Justice Roberts found the 
question close, but concluded that 
WRL was entitled to the advantage 
that base runners enjoy on a close 
play in baseball: “Where the First 
Amendment is implicated, the tie 
goes to the speaker, not the censor.”38 
 In Randall v. Sorrell in 2006, the 
Court held that two Vermont statutory 
provisions – one limiting amounts 
that candidates for state office could 
spend on their own campaigns, 
and the other limiting campaign 
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contributions by other entities – 
violated the First Amendment’s free 
speech guarantee.39  In the lower 
courts, a central issue was whether the 
state legislature sought to help insulate 
incumbents from effective opposition 
at the polls.  Applying a basketball 
term for an easy offensive score that 
overpowers the opposition, dissenting 
Justice Stevens cited district court 
findings in an unrelated case that no 
Albuquerque, New Mexico mayor had 
been re-elected in the 25 years since 
that city set campaign spending limits.  
The uninterrupted pattern of defeat, he 
wrote, “cuts against the view that there 
is a slam-dunk correlation between 
expenditure limits and incumbent 
advantage.”40
 In 1994, NLRB v. Health Care 
and Retirement Corp. held that 
under the National Labor Relations 
Act, the company’s nurses were not 
“employees” with the right to organize 
and engage in collective bargaining, 
but rather were “supervisors” 
who directed the work of aides.41  
Dissenting Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg concluded that the nurses 
spent little time directing aides but, 
like baseball or softball players who 
bat in a teammate’s place, would 
“pinch-hit for aides” when necessary 
to assure proper patient care.42 
 In 1992, the Justices sparred 
about boxing in R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, which struck down a city 
hate-crime ordinance that prohibited 
display of a symbol that “arouses 
anger, alarm or resentment in others 
on the basis of race, color, creed, 
religion or gender.”43 The majority 
found impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination because speakers 
favoring tolerance in the five specified 
matters would be treated differently 
than their opponents. The city “has no 
such authority,” wrote Justice Scalia, 
“to license one side of a debate to fight 
freestyle, while requiring the other to 
follow Marquis of Queensberry rules” 
– the basic rules of boxing published 
in 1867 by John Graham Chambers 
under the sponsorship of John Sholto 
Douglas, the Marquis of Queensbury.44 
Concurring Justice Stevens found no 
viewpoint discrimination because, 
“[t]o extend the Court’s pugilistic 
metaphor, the St. Paul ordinance 
simply bans punches ‘below the belt’ – 
by either party,” that is, blows outside 
the rules because they confer unfair 
advantage by striking at particular 
vulnerability.45 
 In Peretz v. United States, decided 
in 1991, the Court held that the 
Federal Magistrates Act authorizes 
the district court to permit magistrate 
judges to conduct voir dire in felony 
cases with the litigants’ consent.46  The 
majority distinguished a prior decision 
of the Court, which had withheld 
this authority where the parties had 
not consented.47 Writing for himself 
and Justices White and Blackmun, 
dissenting Justice Thurgood Marshall 
argued that the prior decision 
depended on construction of the Act 
and not on absence of consent, and he 
accused the majority of “an amazing 
display of interpretive gymnastics” 
to peg the outcome on a defendant’s 
consent.48  The justices have drawn 
analogies to “gymnastics,” a sport 
marked by agile bodily contortions, 
in more than a dozen decisions since 
Peretz.49   
 Jones v. Thomas, decided in 1989, 
arose from a Missouri prosecution 
for felony-murder and attempted 
robbery.50 After it became apparent 
that the trial court had imposed two 
consecutive sentences where state 
law permitted only one, a state court 
vacated the shorter sentence, which 
the defendant had already served, 
and credited time already served 
against the longer sentence. The 
Court held that the procedure “fully 
vindicated” the defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment double jeopardy rights 
because the defendant did not suffer 
greater punishment than the legislature 
intended.51  Justice Scalia’s dissent 
likened the majority’s rationale to 
excusing a batter’s failure in baseball: 
“A technical rule with equitable 
exceptions is no rule at all. Three 
strikes is out. The state broke the rules 
here, and must abide by the result.”52 
 In Owen v. City of Independence, 
decided in 1980, the Court held 
that when municipalities such as 
the Missouri city are sued under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for violating federally 
protected rights, they may not claim 
qualified good faith immunity from 
liability.53  To bolster his argument 
that strict liability would unreasonably 
subject local governments to damages 
for conduct that was reasonable 
when performed, dissenting Justice 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., joined by Chief 
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart 
and Rehnquist, evoked images of the 
circuitous route characteristic of some 
downhill skiing events. Strict liability, 
Justice Powell wrote, “converts 
municipal governance into a hazardous 
slalom through constitutional 
obstacles that often are unknown and 
unknowable.”54  
 In 1978, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., football 
helped explain the Court’s holding 
that the Administrative Procedure 
Act’s notice-and-comment formula 
“established the maximum procedural 
requirements which Congress was 
willing to have the courts impose upon 
agencies in conducting rulemaking 
procedures.”55  Writing for the 
majority, Justice William H. Rehnquist 
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noted that the court of appeals had 
imposed greater procedures only after 
reviewing the record of the Vermont 
Yankee rulemaking proceeding itself, 
a vantage that he said permitted 
“Monday morning quarterbacking,” 
the second-guessing that happens 
when a writer or fan questions athletic 
strategy or decision-making from the 
relative comfort of hindsight.56   
 In 1973, in United States v. Little 
Lake Misere Land Co., the Court held 
that Louisiana state legislation did not 
affect later acquisitions of land made 
by the United States under the federal 
Migratory Bird Conservation Act.57  
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger’s 
majority opinion recited that the 
lawsuit proceeded to conclusion in 
the federal courts, but only after the 
company first filed in the Louisiana 
courts, and thus, like a track runner 
who leaves the block before the 
starting gun sounds, committed a 
“false start.”58 
SPORTS REFERENCES 
IN LOwER COURT 
OPINIONS 
 Little Lake Misere Land Co. began 
an uninterrupted post-Flood embrace 
of sports references in Supreme 
Court opinions, setting an example 
that has led lower federal and state 
courts also to invoke references drawn 
from a wide range of sports that help 
shape American culture. Some of 
these lower-court sports references 
are ones that have also appeared in 
Supreme Court decisions.59 With 
their significantly larger caseloads, 
however, lower courts also have 
occasion to use sports references that 
have not yet appeared in the United 
States Reports. 
Football
 A 2009 Harris Interactive sur-
vey found that professional football 
remains America’s favorite sport; 31 
percent of Americans who follow 
one or more sports ranked profes-
sional football at the top.60 In Cabell 
Huntington Hospital, Inc. v. Shalala, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit plumbed this wide-
spread popularity when it held that the 
U.S. Secretary of Health and Human 
Services had improperly calculated 
disproportionate-share payments under 
the Medicare statute.61  The key sec-
tion distinguished between patients 
who were “eligible” for Medicaid 
benefits and patients who were “enti-
tled” to them, terms that the Secretary 
contended were interchangeable.  The 
court of appeals rejected the conten-
tion. “In a football game,” the panel 
explained, “wide receivers are eligible 
to receive the ball from the quarter-
back, but none of them is entitled to 
receive it.”62 
 Other lower court opinions describe 
litigation strategy (like a football 
coach’s strategy) as the “game plan,”63 
which may be found in a “playbook.”64 
Parties may engage in preliminary 
“scrimmaging,” a term referring to ex-
hibition or practice games, usually in 
amateur leagues, that do not count in 
league standings in football and other 
sports.65  When opposing parties stake 
out their respective positions, they 
(like the offensive and defensive units 
of opposing football teams) assume 
positions at the “line of scrimmage.”66  
Similar to a running back or pass 
receiver when the quarterback turns 
to him, a party or its representative 
who takes the initiative “carries the 
ball,”67 even while others “stand on the 
sidelines.”68
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit has said that “trial judges 
are somewhat like quarterbacks in that 
they have a broad range of options for 
their game plan.”69  Appellate courts 
grant particular deference to trial 
court fact-finding because “absent an 
evidential vacuum or clear error, the 
final judgment . . . must come from 
the judicial gridiron, and not from 
armchair quarterbacks’ reading of the 
game in Sunday’s paper.”70  When the 
trial court rules on whether to admit 
assertedly cumulative evidence, the 
court must decide whether the prof-
fer would aid the jury, or whether “in 
the parlance of the gridiron, [it] will 
just be piling on,” akin to a late tackle 
on an opposing ball carrier who has 
already been brought down.71
 Like a quarterback who seeks a 
seemingly miraculous victory by 
throwing a long desperation pass to 
a teammate heavily covered near or 
beyond the goal line in the waning 
seconds, a party who faces impend-
ing defeat in court may throw a “Hail 
Mary pass” by pressing a contention 
or argument whose success appears 
remote but not impossible.72  Uncer-
tainty late in the legal proceeding may 
lead to “sudden death overtime,” the 
period played when teams remain 
tied at the end of regulation time in 
football and other sports; “death” is 
“sudden” because the first team to 
score and break the tie wins.73 When 
the court enters final judgment in a 
party’s favor, “[a] win, whether by 
four touchdowns or a last second field 
goal, is a win.”74
baseball
a. The rules and conduct of the game
 “The one constant through all the 
years,” said James Earl Jones (“Ter-
ence Mann”) in the 1989 movie 
classic, Field of Dreams, “has been 
baseball. America has rolled by like an 
37Precedent  Spring 2010
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army of steamrollers.  It’s been erased 
like a blackboard, rebuilt, and erased 
again. But baseball has marked the 
time. This . . . game: it’s a part of our 
past . . . . It reminds us of all that once 
was good, and that could be again.”75  
 From this profound national heri-
tage, judges “often draw on baseball 
analogies.”76 In Linton v. Missouri 
Veterinary Medical Board, for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
rejected the equal protection chal-
lenge of an applicant who was denied 
a license after she failed the licensing 
examination three times in Missouri 
and once in Illinois, though her Illinois 
grade on an examination identical to 
Missouri’s exceeded Missouri’s pass-
ing grade.77 The Missouri licensing 
statute provided applicants only three 
tries to pass. 
 Judge Michael A. Wolff, dissenting 
in Linton, concluded that the defen-
dant board had no rational basis for 
denying the applicant a license: “There 
is something inherent in the American 
culture about three strikes, probably 
because of our national pastime. . . . 
[E]ven in baseball, a batter is allowed 
more than three swings because a 
foul ball, which normally counts as a 
strike, does not count when it occurs 
on the third strike. Thus a batter may 
swing at several pitches before get-
ting a hit, and it is no less a hit than if 
it had occurred on the first or second 
swing. . . . [A] pass on the fourth try 
is no less a hit than a passing grade on 
the first try. The analogy to baseball 
is not entirely apt, because after three 
strikes, the batter is only ‘out’ – not 
banned for eternity.”78
 By helping another person, an indi-
vidual or entity “goes to bat for” the 
person.79  A party that takes the initia-
tive “steps up to the plate,” as a batter 
does when he gets ready to face the 
pitcher.80 A party that suffers a default 
judgment without having received 
constitutionally sufficient notice is 
“called out on strikes without ever 
being allowed a turn at bat.”81  When 
a party fails to satisfy a threshold 
requirement for relief, the party fails to 
“get out of the batter’s box,”82 or else 
to reach “first base.”83 When a court 
moves toward decision after more than 
one hearing, the judges “step back into 
the batter’s box, having allowed one to 
go by us and tipping another, in hopes 
that on our third and final swing we 
can avoid a judicial strike-out.”84 
 By advancing confusing or unex-
pected facts or arguments, a party or 
witness throws a curve ball, similar to 
the pitch designed to confuse a batter.85 
Parties showing apparent restraint may 
“bunt,”86 but parties seeking immedi-
ate advantage with strong claims or 
defenses “swing for the fences,” like 
their baseball counterparts trying to hit 
a home run.87  An experienced police 
officer may perceive a casual street 
encounter as a drug transaction, “just 
as a trained observer on the baseball 
diamond might be able to point out the 
bunt sign among an array of otherwise 
meaningless scratches and touches by 
the third base coach.”88 
 A party without standing suffers dis-
missal because “[t]o score a home run 
the plaintiff must first have touched 
first base.”89 To show a substantial 
likelihood of success on the merits 
necessary to establish entitlement to 
a preliminary injunction, the movant 
“need not establish that he can hit a 
home run, only that he can get on base, 
with a possibility of scoring later.”90  
A party that enjoys overwhelming 
success before settlement or final 
judgment is akin to a batter who hits a 
“home run”91 or a “grand slam”92 with 
the bases loaded, or to a pitcher who 
turns in a “perfect game”93 by retiring 
all 27 batters without allowing any to 
reach base. 
 By focusing on the facts and claims, 
the parties and the court keep their 
“eyes on the ball,” an offensive and 
defensive fundamental in baseball and 
several other sports.94 A judicially-
created rule that shortcuts the ordinary 
method for calculating entitlement to 
relief “essentially allows the claim-
ant, after successfully reaching first 
base, to be waved home and exempted 
from traversing to second and third 
bases, thus improperly converting a 
single into a home run”; as base run-
ners know, they can be called out for 
leaving the base path, or for failing to 
touch a base on the way to the next.95  
A party that selects among reason-
able alternatives executes a “fielder’s 
choice,” similar to the option enjoyed 
by the defensive team which, with one 
or more players on base, may get an 
out at any base to which an offensive 
player seeks to advance.96   
 Like a ballplayer who misses part 
of pre-season conditioning before 
Opening Day, a party making a belated 
argument may suffer for being “late 
to spring training.”97 A party’s offer or 
estimate within a particular range may 
present a “ballpark figure.”98 By seek-
ing a continuance or otherwise post-
poning action, a party requests a “rain 
check,” similar to the substitute pass 
which permits ticket holders to attend 
a future makeup game when inclem-
ent weather causes postponement of 
today’s game.99 
 A party’s relatively inconsequential 
act, or its ineffective argument or ac-
tion or request, may be “bush league,” 
that is, worthy only of a lower minor 
league game and not of major league 
competition.100 An odd or unsupported 
argument or request may come “out of 
left field,”101 but a well-crafted argu-
ment or judicial opinion “touches all 
the bases.”102 When litigants approach 
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finality with the outcome in doubt, 
they may enter the “late innings,” the 
“ninth inning,” or may even approach 
“extra innings,” which opposing base-
ball teams play to break a tie at the end 
of the game.103
 The court may call a judicial 
“infield fly rule” to thwart a party’s 
effort to profit from sharp tactics. (In 
baseball, the infield fly rule applies 
when there are less than two outs and 
a force play is possible at third base or 
home plate; so that the infielder cannot 
intentionally drop a fly ball and get 
an easy double play or triple play, the 
umpire calls the batter automatically 
out if the fly ball remains in fair ter-
ritory and, in the umpire’s judgment, 
could be caught by the infielder with 
ordinary effort.)104
b. The umpire
 “Baseball fits America well,” said 
former Major League Baseball Com-
missioner A. Bartlett Giamatti, “be-
cause it expresses our longing for the 
rule of law while licensing our resent-
ment of law givers” – the umpires.105  
“Much like an umpire in a baseball 
game who does not make the rules 
defining the strike zone but must only 
call the balls and the strikes,” says 
the Tennessee Court of Appeals, “the 
jurist has the duty to apply the laws 
as written.”106  “[A] judge’s job,” adds 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, “is like 
an umpire’s, . . . to make calls accord-
ing to the rules, not according to the 
voices of a partisan crowd.”107 
 In Haluck v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc., 
the California Court of Appeal rejected 
the defendants’ argument that the trial 
judge’s misconduct did not amount to 
reversible error because the miscon-
duct affected both sides equally.108 The 
panel likened the argument to “saying 
a baseball team could not complain if 
the umpire decided to call balls and 
strikes with his eyes closed, as long as 
he kept them closed for both teams.”109
 In Canady v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc.,110 a divided panel of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit affirmed summary judgment for 
the defendant store in an employment 
discrimination suit that arose from a 
white assistant store manager’s repeat-
ed use of racial slurs in the presence of 
the black employees and co-workers. 
One judge argued that the assistant 
manager’s apology for one early slur 
had no legal significance. “If a base-
ball player harassed an umpire over a 
called strike, thereafter apologized, but 
once again swore at the umpire, there 
can be little question that the umpire 
would eject the ballplayer from the 
game.”111  
 In Huffaker v. Ramella, the Ohio 
Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court decision that had shortened the 
filing period provided in court rules; 
the decision below meant parties had 
“fallen victim to the old hidden ball 
trick typically practiced by a first 
baseman after an opponent has come 
up with a single. . . . [But] the tag 
was made by someone comparable to 
the first base umpire, i.e., the judge, 
instead of the first baseman.”112  
basketball
 Even before President Barack 
Obama “shot hoops” before television 
cameras during the 2008 campaign 
and then became the game’s “first 
fan,” the National Basketball As-
sociation had moved “from a strug-
gling sports league to an era-defining 
cultural phenomenon.”113 Lower courts 
have taken notice. Judges have lik-
ened a party’s aggressive strategy, for 
example, to a “full-court press,” a bas-
ketball strategy used by the defensive 
team to pressure the offensive team 
up and down the court.114 A candidate 
who sought to disqualify a potential 
opponent from the ballot on a techni-
cality was “trying to win the champi-
onship on a technical foul rather than 
taking the opposing team to the hoop 
in a spirited election contest. Unfor-
tunately, you can win on a technical 
foul.”115
 “A good judge in a trial is like a 
good referee in a basketball game; 
when he sees a foul committed, he 
blows the whistle and tries to right the 
wrong.”116 In Tejada v. Dubois, the 
trial judge and defense counsel had 
provoked each other throughout the 
acrimonious trial, but the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit de-
clined to apportion blame.117 The panel 
found itself “in much the same posi-
tion as a basketball referee who sees a 
player throw an elbow at an adversary 
but cannot tell if the blow was the ini-
tial foul or a retaliatory strike. . . . But 
unlike the basketball referee, [the court 
of appeals had] no need to decide 
whether to assess a single foul or a 
double foul” because the overall acri-
mony prejudiced the defendant’s effort 
to present an effective defense.118  
 “[A] stakeholder is to a ‘stake’ he 
controls as a basketball referee is to 
a jump-ball. He holds it, but he does 
not claim it for his own. Rather, he 
willingly allows the rival contestants 
to fight for it.”119 In Blackfeet National 
Bank v. Nelson, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected 
the plaintiff bank’s claim that because 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration fully insured an unmatured 
certificate of deposit (to $100,000) 
up to its maturity date, the CD was a 
bank deposit that the plaintiff could 
sell.120  “We cannot decide the nature 
of this instrument at its maturity date 
any more than a referee could decide 
the winner of a basketball game at 
halftime.”121
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 In State v. Weatherspoon, a concur-
ring judge observed that the need to 
justify race-neutral bases for peremp-
tory strikes of potential jurors would 
put “pressure on trial judges, as there 
is now on basketball referees . . . to 
‘roughly equalize the foul calls.’”122 As 
basketball fans know, a team playing 
particularly rough or dirty should ac-
cumulate more fouls than the opposi-
tion, and “evening up” the number of 
foul calls for the sake of appearance or 
competitive parity may be the sign of 
poor refereeing.  
Next issue: Sports references in the 
lower federal and state courts (con-
tinued); how advocates and judges 
should use sports references in writ-
ten advocacy and opinions.
Much of this two-part article original-
ly appeared in 17 VillanoVa SportS and 
EntErtainmEnt law Journal 1 (2010). 
Reprinted by permission. Fuller notes 
appear in the law Journal article.
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